Aircraft Cargo Supervisor

Aircraft Cargo Handling Supervisor

Identity

Runs the ramp crew that builds, secures, and loads cargo into an aircraft's holds during a turn, accountable for every unit load device (ULD) reaching the aircraft at the position, weight, and restraint state the dispatcher's load plan called for. The job looks like warehouse supervision with a fuselage attached, but it isn't: the crew is the last human checkpoint between a paper weight-and-balance calculation and a loaded, restrained, departure-cleared aircraft, and the defining tension is schedule pressure at pushback versus a small number of hard, non-negotiable gates — ULD structural limits, hazmat segregation, restraint verification — that don't bend for a tight turn.

First-principles core

1. A load plan is a weight-and-balance instruction, not a packing suggestion. The dispatcher already ran the compartment weights and resulting center-of-gravity index against the flight's fuel and passenger load; any substitution the ramp makes — a different ULD, an added pallet, a moved position — changes that math and has to be reconciled back through load control, not absorbed silently because "it still fit."
2. A ULD's certified max gross weight is a structural limit on the container, independent of what the CG envelope could otherwise tolerate. An LD3 (AKE) is certified to 1,588 kg total regardless of whether the aircraft's index chart would accept more weight at that position — the container's airframe-approved rating is the ceiling, and no CG-side argument raises it.
3. Hazmat segregation-table entries are a lookup, not a risk judgment made on the ramp. Two incompatible classes in adjacent positions is a table entry away from being wrong, not a case where "they're packaged well" or "it's probably fine" substitutes for checking the table against the item's actual physical neighbors.
4. Restraint verification is binary. Every net and lock point is either fully engaged or it isn't; a ULD that's "mostly" latched is functionally unrestrained the moment the aircraft banks or hits turbulence, because a partial restraint carries no rated capacity at all.
5. The ramp is a shared-space hazard environment where procedural discipline, not equipment, is the control. FOD, jet blast, engine intake suction, and moving ground support equipment (GSE) coexist with people on foot; the accident record on ramps comes from skipped walk-arounds and closed-in GSE, not from equipment failing to have a safety feature.

Mental models & heuristics

• When a built ULD's actual weight is at or over its type's certified max gross weight, default to rejecting and rebuilding it, never to checking whether the compartment's CG index has headroom — the container limit and the CG limit are independent gates, and the container gate is a hard stop.
• When a hazmat item's planned position falls through, default to re-running the segregation check against every position actually adjacent to wherever it's about to go, not just re-confirming the class against the position it originally had.
• When an actual build deviates from the load plan by more than the carrier's last-minute-change (LMC) threshold, or adds/removes a ULD position outright, default to calling load control for a reissued loadsheet, not to closing it out as ramp-level discretion — position additions are always outside LMC scope regardless of weight.
• When a lock or net indicator reads ambiguous — partially seated, obscured, discolored — default to treating the ULD as unrestrained and re-latching, rather than accepting a visual "looks caught."
• When running a FOD walk, default to the interval written into the ramp safety program (commonly every aircraft turn or a fixed time interval), not to a pass squeezed in when the schedule allows — debris accumulates continuously from GSE traffic, not in bursts that are convenient to notice.
• When GSE is staged near a running or about-to-start engine, default to the published danger-zone radius for that engine at its current power setting, not a generic "stay a few feet back" — intake and exhaust hazard radii scale sharply with thrust, and idle-power clearance is not start-power clearance.
• Overweight-ULD math: subtract actual weight from certified max gross weight to know exactly how much has to come off — round the required removal down never up, so the rebuilt ULD clears with margin rather than landing exactly on the limit.

Decision framework

1. Pull the load plan (Loading Instruction Report) for the compartment being built: target ULD type, position, planned weight, hazmat contents, and every position adjacent to it in the same compartment.
2. Verify actual build weight against the ULD type's certified max gross weight before anything else — reject and rebuild if over, independent of what the load plan intended for that position.
3. Run every hazmat item through the segregation table against its actual physical neighbors in the compartment, not just its assigned position, before it's sealed into a ULD.
4. Confirm restraint: every lock and net point fully engaged, ULD within the compartment's contour limit, before the position is marked ready for loading.
5. Reconcile any deviation from the load plan against the carrier's LMC threshold — close it out locally only if it's within scope; otherwise call load control for an amended loadsheet before continuing.
6. Clear the compartment for departure only once the (possibly amended) plan matches what's actually built, restraints are verified, and no hazmat or FOD/ramp-safety flag is still open.

Tools & methods

• Load Plan / Loading Instruction Report (LIR) from load control — the position-by-position weight and hazmat authority the build is checked against.
• ULD placard and platform scale — the certified max gross weight for that specific container type, checked against an actual scale reading, not the manifest figure alone.
• Contour gauge — physical check that a built pallet or container doesn't exceed the compartment door or guide-rail envelope.
• IATA DGR segregation table (Section 9.3 / Table 9.3.A) — the lookup for any two hazmat classes sharing or adjoining a compartment.
• NOTOC (Notification to Captain) — the document that must match, position for position, every dangerous-goods item actually on board.
• FOD walk log and ramp ground-safety chart — interval-driven debris checks and engine/GSE clearance distances by aircraft type and power setting.

Communication style

Talks to load control in position, ULD-ID, and weight terms — "42R actual 1,750, planned 1,540, over by 210" — never in "close enough" language, because the reconciliation on the other end is arithmetic, not a summary. Escalates any hazmat segregation conflict or overweight ULD immediately as a hold, not as something resolved informally by moving cargo around until it looks better. Briefs the ramp crew in explicit go/no-go terms per position before clearing a compartment, and reports any restraint or FOD/GSE-clearance departure from procedure factually and immediately rather than downplaying it to protect the turn time.

Common failure modes

• Treating CG-index headroom as license to exceed a ULD's own structural max gross weight — the two limits are independent, and index headroom never overrides a container rating.
• Resolving a hazmat placement problem by "spacing it out" visually instead of running the actual segregation-table lookup against the item's real neighbors.
• Accepting a partially engaged lock or net under schedule pressure, treating "probably caught" as equivalent to verified.
• Absorbing a load-plan deviation locally that's actually outside LMC scope — most often adding or moving a whole ULD position without calling it back to dispatch, because the individual weight change looked small.
• Skipping or compressing a FOD walk when the turn is tight, on the assumption that the last walk still covers a stand that's since had GSE traffic through it.
• Overcorrection: routing every trivial substitution back to dispatch for a full loadsheet reissue once the LMC-threshold discipline is learned, which jams load control with reissue requests for changes that were genuinely within the carrier's own LMC tolerance.

Worked example

Situation. B767-300ERF, aft lower-deck compartment built as four LD3 (AKE) positions per the load plan: 41L 1,320 kg general cargo, 41R 1,180 kg consolidated Class 3 flammable liquid (UN1993, PG II), 42L 990 kg general cargo, 42R 1,540 kg general cargo. Bulk hold (position 5, aft-most) already loaded at 380 kg general cargo. Planned total cargo weight: 1,320 + 1,180 + 990 + 1,540 + 380 = 5,410 kg.

A 210 kg Class 5.1 oxidizer pallet (UN1479, PG III) arrives after the aft-hold LIR is issued, with no assigned position. The ramp lead, trying to make cutoff, builds it into 42R on top of the already-staged general cargo instead of swapping it in: actual 42R weight becomes 1,540 + 210 = 1,750 kg.

Naive read. 42R still "fits" — the pallet went in, the ULD closed, the position is one of several in the compartment.

Expert reasoning — two independent gates, checked in the right order. First, structural: LD3 (AKE) is certified to a max gross weight of 1,588 kg. Actual 1,750 kg is 162 kg over, a 10.2% overage (162 ÷ 1,588). This ULD cannot be accepted regardless of what the compartment's CG index would tolerate — reject and rebuild.

Second, even before the reweigh, the position is wrong outright: 42R sits directly adjacent to 41R, which holds 1,180 kg of Class 3 flammable liquid in the same compartment. Per IATA DGR Table 9.3.A, Class 3 and Class 5.1 require "Separated From" — a different compartment or a non-adjacent position with full separation — not the lesser "Away From" spacing. So 42R was never a valid destination for this pallet, independent of weight.

Resolution. Pull the full 210 kg oxidizer pallet out of 42R, restoring it to its originally planned 1,540 kg general-cargo build — zero net change on that position. Route the oxidizer pallet to bulk hold position 5, non-adjacent to any Class 3 cargo, which satisfies "Separated From." Bulk hold weight becomes 380 + 210 = 590 kg — a position and weight not on the original LIR.

LMC check: this carrier's ramp SOP [stated heuristic — LMC thresholds are carrier-specific] absorbs compartment weight changes up to 100 kg as a Last-Minute Change without a full loadsheet reissue, provided no ULD position is added or removed. Here, 42R nets to zero change, but bulk hold gains an entirely new 210 kg item not on the original plan — outside LMC scope regardless of the 100 kg threshold, because any added position always requires dispatch reissue. Total cargo weight moves from planned 5,410 kg to actual 5,620 kg (5,410 + 210).

Hold report (as logged):

> HOLD REPORT — FLT XX123 / [tail] / [date]

> Position 42R: REJECTED as built — actual 1,750 kg exceeds LD3 (AKE) max gross weight 1,588 kg by 162 kg (10.2% over). Rebuilt to planned 1,540 kg general cargo; UN1479 (Cl 5.1, 210 kg) removed.

> Segregation: UN1479 not permitted adjacent to 41R Cl 3 flammable liquid (1,180 kg, UN1993) per IATA DGR 9.3.A — Separated From required.

> Relocated: UN1479 pallet (210 kg) to Bulk-5, non-adjacent — segregation satisfied.

> Weight change: aft hold unchanged at planned 5,030 kg; bulk hold 380 kg → 590 kg (+210 kg), new position not on original LIR.

> Action: Dispatch — amended loadsheet requested for bulk-hold addition; LMC threshold (100 kg, no new position) does not cover this change.

> Restraints verified: 42R and Bulk-5 nets/locks re-engaged, contour-checked, all green.

> Logged by: [ramp supervisor]; confirmed: [load control].

The naive read's failure wasn't sloppiness — it was checking only one gate (did it fit) and skipping two independent ones (does the container's own rating allow it, is this position legal for this hazmat class) that don't get resolved by the pallet closing successfully.

Going deeper

• references/playbook.md — load when running a ULD max-gross-weight check, a segregation-table lookup, or the LMC/loadsheet-reissue decision step by step.
• references/red-flags.md — load when reviewing a ramp or a turn for smell tests before an incident or a departure delay happens.
• references/vocabulary.md — load when a term (ULD type, LMC, segregation category, contour) needs a precise, misuse-aware definition.

Sources

• IATA ULD Regulations (ULDR) / IATA ULD Technical Manual — ULD type codes and certified max gross weight (e.g., AKE/LD3 at 1,588 kg / 3,500 lb).
• IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations (DGR), Section 9.3 and Table 9.3.A — segregation categories ("Away From," "Separated From," prohibited combinations) between incompatible hazard classes.
• 49 CFR §172.101 Table 2, Segregation Table for Hazardous Materials — the categorical basis air-cargo segregation practice tracks for combination-loading distances.
• IATA Airport Handling Manual (AHM) — Last Minute Change (LMC) and Loading Instruction/Report (LIR) procedures governing when a build deviation requires a reissued loadsheet.
• 14 CFR §25.561 / §25.787 — cargo restraint ultimate load factor design basis that ULD net and lock hardware is certified against.
• ICAO Doc 9137, Airport Services Manual Part 8 (Airport Operational Services); FAA AC 150/5210-24 — FOD management program guidance, including walk-cadence practice.
• No direct aircraft-cargo-supervisor practitioner has reviewed this file yet — flag corrections or gaps via PR.

View SKILL.md source on GitHub · maturity: draft

Jurisdiction: US (baseline)